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This paper documents the growth and geographic distribution of nontraditional mortgages 
(NTMs) and subprime mortgages during 2000-2006, and examines the association 
between these products and homeownership at the county level between 2000 and 2012. 
It finds a significant relationship between the origination of NTM and subprime 
mortgages during the boom and changes in the number of homeowners (positive during 
the 2000-2006 period and negative during the 2006-2012 period) but no significant 
relationship with the change in the homeownership rate. Looking at specific categories of 
the population, the results indicate a positive relationship between the presence of NTMs 
and subprime mortgages and increased numbers of homeowners for young households as 
well as for low income and minority households, but the relationship is smaller than for 
the general population. Overall, the relationship between NTMs and homeownership is 
stronger than the relationship between subprime mortgages and homeownership during 
the boom and it is less negative during the bust. 
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I. Introduction 
 Most households cannot purchase a first home without a mortgage. Thus, credit 
markets are important for access to homeownership (Linneman and Wachter 1989). The 
first half of the 2000s saw significant changes and innovations in mortgage markets, 
perhaps most notably the increased prevalence of non-traditional mortgage products 
(NTMs) and an increased access to mortgages for subprime borrowers.1 In this article we 
define NTMs as purchase mortgages with features that differ substantially from the 
traditional fully-amortizing 30-year mortgages and subprime mortgages as loans to low 
credit score borrowers.2 We use a database that contains information on the 
characteristics of mortgages that are securitized in Private Label Securities (PLS) to 
measure the prevalence of NTM and the list of subprime lenders developed by HUD to 
identify subprime loans. The NTM definition is therefore based on product characteristics 
while subprime captures access to credit by households with low credit scores through 
specialized lenders.   
The prevalence of NTM and subprime mortgages expanded considerably between 
2001 and 2006, both absolutely and as a share of total mortgage lending across the 
nation.3 For NTMs, this represented an expansion into the mainstream of mortgage 
products that had been marginal until then. For subprime mortgages, the growth reflected 
an expansion of credit to increasingly marginal borrowers. While numerous papers have 
                                                
1 These two developments are connected but separate. Non-traditional mortgages are mortgage products 
with characteristics that differ substantially from the fully amortizable 30 year fixed-rate mortgages, “the 
American Mortgage” (Green and Wachter 2005). Subprime mortgages are loans made to borrowers with 
low credit score (variously defined as below 680, 640 or 620). Many NTMs were originated to subprime 
borrowers and many subprime borrowers used NTMs (Bostic et al. 2012). The correlation between the 
share of NTM and the share of subprime mortgages at the county level is 0.7 based on the data and 
definition used in this paper. 
2 We provide more details about the datasets used to measure NTM and subprime in Section III. 
3 We restrict our sample to purchase mortgages here but these products were also used for refinancing. 
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shown that the prevalence of NTMs and subprime mortgages have contributed to the run 
up of house price and the subsequent mortgage market crisis (see, e.g., Bostic and Lee 
2008; Mian and Sufi 2011; Pavlov and Wachter 2011), little has been done regarding the 
association between NTMs and subprime mortgages and homeownership. As we will 
discuss in section II, this is an empirical question as in theory the use of NTMs and 
subprime mortgages could have relaxed credit constraints and thus have increased 
homeownership, or NTMs and subprime mortgages could have acted as substitutes of 
traditional mortgages and thus have had no impact on homeownership. 
Moreover, this is an important issue because a popular narrative points to a role of the 
expansion of credit in the early 2000s in the increase in homeownership. In particular the 
public discourse conflates the expansion of subprime and nontraditional mortgage 
lending with an expansion in homeownership, particularly for low income and minority 
households. This relationship has actually not been examined empirically in the literature 
and has important implications for the role of credit supply expansion in the increase in 
homeownership numbers and rate during the crisis and the closing of homeownership 
gaps across racial and ethnic groups. 
This article addresses this gap by estimating the association between the presence of 
NTMs and subprime mortgages at the county level between 2001 and 2006 and the 
change in the number and share of homeowners between 2000 and 2006 (the boom 
period) and 2006 and 2012 (the bust period). During the early 2000s, NTMs and 
subprime mortgages evolved from being niche products to representing a substantial 
share of mortgages used for home purchases during the housing boom to virtually 
disappearing following the housing bust. We develop a unique county-level dataset which 
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combines census data on homeownership with public data on subprime mortgages and 
proprietary data for NTMs. Because we include demographic data on borrower age and 
racial/ethnic status we can examine the relationship of the use of these products and 
homeownership for subgroups as well as for the entire population. 
We find a positive and significant association between NTM and subprime mortgage 
use and changes in the number of homeowners but no significant association with 
changes in the homeownership rate, during the boom period of 2000 to 2006. We extend 
the examination of these relationships through 2012 and find a negative and significant 
association between NTMs and subprime mortgage activity and changes in the number of 
homeowners during the bust. Over the 2000-2012 period the relationship between the 
number and share of NTMs and subprime mortgages originated during the boom and 
changes in the number of homeowners remains positive overall. 
Looking at specific categories of the population, we find a positive relationship 
between the presence of NTMs and subprime mortgages and increased numbers of 
homeowners for young households as well as for low income and minority households, 
but the relationship is smaller than for the general population. These results are consistent 
with a view that these products were not used in a way associated with increases in 
homeownership more by low-income and minority households. The findings suggest that 
the expansion of NTMs and subprime lending was not associated with a disproportionate 
increase in homeownership among minority and low income. 
We also distinguish the relationships associated with NTMs from those associated 
with subprime mortgages. As above, we consider whether any differences are robust to 
the cycle across geographies. Overall, the relationship between NTMs and 
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homeownership is stronger than the relationship between subprime mortgages and 
homeownership during the boom and it is less negative during the bust, pointing to a 
distinction between product and borrower characteristics. The paper proceeds as follows. 
Section II reviews the literature that has analyzed nontraditional and subprime mortgages 
and their impact on economic outcomes such as household consumption and prices. 
Section III presents the dataset and definitions we develop to document the evolution of 
NTMs and subprime mortgages and establish some stylized facts about each. Section IV 
presents the empirical exploration of the relationship between NTMs and subprime 
mortgages and homeownership. Section V discusses policy implications and concludes. 
 
II. Literature Review 
An extensive literature examines the role of the credit expansion in the recent housing 
boom and bust (Essene and Apgar 2007; Mayer and Pence 2008; Mian and Sufi 2011; 
Campbell 2012; Cocco 2013; Brueckner, Calem and Nakamura 2012; 2016; see Levitin 
and Wachter 2013 for a review) and whether the expansion was concentrated among low 
income and minority borrowers (Mian and Sufi 2011; 2015) or more widespread 
(Adelino, Schoar and Severino 2015; 2016; Foote, Loewenstein and Willen 2016). 
Rather than focusing on the means and mechanisms through which credit expanded, 
which has been the subject of a number of papers on this topic (Mayer and Pence 2008; 
Bhutta 2015; Foote, Loewenstein and Willen 2016), this paper focuses on an end product 
of mortgage credit - homeownership. Specifically, we ask whether the expansion of credit 
at the local level through NTMs and subprime mortgages was associated with an increase 
in the number of homeowners and in the homeownership rate. While it is often assumed 
 6 
 
that the expansion in credit through NTMs and subprime credit was associated with an 
increase in the number or share of homeowners, this need not be the case.  
NTMs and subprime mortgages could have contributed to an increase in 
homeownership by contributing to the relaxation of credit constraints found in the 
literature (Barakova, Calem and Wachter 2014; Gabriel and Rosenthal 2015; Brueckner, 
Calem and Nakamura 2016; Acolin et al. 2016a; 2016b). Theoretical models show that 
NTMs and subprime mortgages can effectively remove borrowing constraints (Chinloy 
and Macdonald 2005; LaCour-Little and Yang 2010; Cocco 2013). Results from an 
experiment show that the type of credit offered affects households stated tenure choice 
(Fuster and Zafar 2016). 
It is also possible that the expansion of NTMs and subprime mortgages was not 
associated with a change in the number and share of homeowners. Existing homeowners 
may have used NTMs and subprime mortgages to consume more housing or purchase 
housing in better neighborhoods or to purchase non-housing goods (Foote, Loewenstein 
and Willen 2016). New homeowners may have substituted NTMs and subprime 
mortgages for existing mortgage products. For example, borrowers may have substituted 
mortgages insured by FHA with subprime mortgages (Jaffee 2009; Nichols, Pennington-
Cross and Yezer 2005) or traditional FRM and ARM products with NTMs (LaCour-Little 
and Yang 2010; Amromin et al. 2011). With regards to NTMs at least (LaCour-Little and 
Yang 2010; Amromin et al. 2011) the evidence indicates that they were used by 
consumers with higher credit scores, suggesting they might have acted more on the 
intensive margin (the quantity of housing consumed) than on the extensive margin (new 
homeowners). Another reason for the possible absence of a link between homeownership 
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and the use of NTMs and subprime mortgages is that investors may have 
disproportionately used these mortgages (Haughwout et al. 2011; Bhutta 2015). Finally, 
the increase in prices associated with NTM and subprime lending worked against the 
affordability gains possible via the features of these products, potentially limiting the 
number of new homeowners. In short, the relationship between these products and 
homeownership remains an outstanding question.  
In addition, an important aspect of access to homeownership identified in the 
literature is the degree to which associations vary across populations, with a particular 
consideration of whether associations were stronger or weaker among young, low income 
or minority populations. Young, low-income and minority households are most affected 
by borrowing constraints (Haurin et al., 1997; Gyourko et al., 1999). The early literature 
on mortgage discrimination and redlining pointed to geographical differences at the local 
level in the supply of mortgage credit as impacting homeownership outcomes. More 
recently, Mian and Sufi (2011) point to the increase in mortgage debt in the boom years 
among lower income households, as a way of increasing consumption including housing 
consumption.  
 
III. The Evolution of NTMs and Subprime Mortgages over Time 
We begin by documenting trends in the volume and distribution of NTMs and 
subprime mortgages.4 For this paper, we use an extensive definition of NTM as any loan 
that substantially differs from the traditional fully amortizing and documented FRM and 
ARM products. A loan is classified as an NTM if it is a mortgage to purchase an 
individual unit (condo, co-op, single family) and has any of the following characteristics: 
                                                
4 For both types of product we restrict our sample to first lien purchase mortgages. 
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(i) interest only (IO), (ii) Option-ARM with negative amortization, (iii) balloon payment, 
(iv) teaser rate, (v) terms longer than 30 years,5 (vi) combined loan to value ratio (CLTV) 
at origination above 100 percent6 or (vii) low or no documentation.7 The first four 
categories (IO, Option-ARM, Balloon and Teaser) are characterized by features enabling 
a backloading of payments –what Brueckner, Calem and Nakamura (2016) call 
alternative mortgage product (AMP) –which along with longer repayment terms address 
the income constraint by decreasing initial payments but result in a payment shock. No or 
low documentation loans can let people with irregular or undocumented assets and 
income qualify for a mortgage. Finally, high CLTV loans address the wealth constraint 
by lowering the downpayment requirement.8 
We use the proprietary BlackBox dataset on private label securities (PLS) to count 
the number of NTMs originated in a county in a given year.9 We believe that the 
BlackBox data are representative of the universe of NTMs because most NTMs were 
securitized via PLS, although some mortgage originators kept NTM loans on portfolio. 
                                                
5 The threshold used is actually 365 months since mortgages with terms between 360 and 365 are not 
different by nature and may reflect reporting error. 
6 Combined Loan To Value (CLTV) combines the balance on the first and second mortgage (piggyback) to 
capture the overall level of leverage 
7 This is a comprehensive definition of NTM that goes beyond the definition of “alternative mortgage 
products used in LaCour-Little and Yang (2010) and Brueckner, Calem and Nakamura (2016) or of 
complex mortgages in Amromin et al. (2011) that restrict the definition to IO and Option ARM for 
example. We also tried alternative definitions by including hybrid ARMs, mortgages with prepayment 
penalties and changing the threshold for CLTV to strictly above 100 percent CLTV or decreasing it to 97 
percent. The results are broadly similar and available upon request. 
8 This definition of NTM is inclusive but heterogenous and the relationship with homeownership could 
vary across attribute. As we show in Table 3 and discuss below, the correlation between different attributes 
is always above .5 but substantially below one. To test for the importance of this heterogeneity, we 
separated the attributes based on the type of constraint they are expected to contribute overcoming: income 
(Option ARM with negative amortization, Interest Only loans, loans with balloon payments, low or no doc, 
terms over 30 years and teaser rates), wealth (high CLTV). In both cases, the estimates are similar to those 
obtained with the overall NTM measure." 
9 BlackBox has detailed information about more than 14 million first-lien loans originated between 1998 
and 2013 that were securitized in PLS. 
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Moreover, estimates of NTM loan volumes using the BlackBox data conform to 
estimates using other data sources.10  
The BlackBox data demonstrate that NTMs are a complex group of loans. While a 
mortgage could have any 1 of 7 distinct characteristics and be considered an NTM for 
this study, many loans originated during this period had multiple qualifying features. 
Table 1 shows how the mortgages are distributed along this metric for the period 2001-
2010 among counties in our sample. We see that a majority of the loans had at least two 
features and a significant fraction had more than four such features. 
Table 2 provides a picture of which characteristics were most common among NTMs 
in our sample by reporting the fraction of NTMs in a given year that had a particular 
feature. We see that low or no documentation were common features among NTMs in 
every year. By contrast, between 2001 and 2006 we see large growth in the incidence of 
interest only mortgages, and mortgages with a high CLTV at origination. Option-ARMs 
with negative amortization were the least common feature. 
For subprime lending, we use data collected pursuant to the Home Mortgage 
Disclosure Act (HMDA). Banking and other institutions that make decisions on whether 
to originate a mortgage are required to report annually on all mortgage applications they 
receive.11 We use the number of loans issued by subprime lenders, which were identified 
by HUD, as our measure of the number of subprime mortgages. The HUD subprime 
lender list is publically available via the Urban Institute (Pettit and Droesch, 2009). This 
                                                
10 For example, we estimate that 31 percent of mortgages issued in 2006 were NTMs, a figure close to the 
30 percent reported in Sanders (2008) using CoreLogic data and to the 32 percent reported in Inside 
Mortgage Finance (2013). Further, there is no evidence suggesting that NTMs kept on portfolio have a 
different spatial distribution than those securitized in PLS. 
11 Avery, et al. (2011) estimates that HMDA data cover more than 80 percent of the total mortgage 
origination market. 
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list is imperfect since all loans issued by a subprime lender will be classified as subprime 
even if the lender also issued prime or alt-a loans. Nonetheless it offers a reasonable 
picture of trends over time and comparisons with other sources show that while the levels 
vary, the trends using HMDA are similar to those using LPS (Mayer and Pence 2008). 
Comparisons with measures developed using the subprime variable available in 
BlackBox based on the security or FICO score also show similar trends despite 
differences in levels with a correlation between both measures of .88. Because the 
HMDA based measure is estimated to be more comprehensive and is generally used in 
the literature we use it in the empirical analysis below. 
Figure 1 shows how NTM and subprime mortgage origination volumes evolved from 
1997 through 2010 for NTMs and through 2006 for subprime mortgages in counties in 
our sample. After being a very minor product through 2000, never totaling more than 
50,000 loans, NTM incidence exploded. NTM volume doubled each year from 2001 to 
2004, and annual NTM origination volume doubled again between 2004 and 2006. 
Overall, NTMs increased from less than 100,000 to more than 1.7 million over this 
period. Similarly, while there were less than 300,000 subprime mortgage originations in 
2000, there were more than 1.2 million of them in 2005.12 After 2006, the prevalence of 
NTMs and subprime loans dropped precipitously, as the housing crisis resulted in a rapid 
change in the supply of these products across the nation. By the end of our study period, 
NTMs had not made a comeback. 
                                                
12 The way subprime loans are identified from HMDA changes after 2006, from relying on a list of 
subprime originators identified by HUD to being based on a spread of the mortgage rate at origination 
relative to prime (3 percentage points). In order to remain consistent and given our period of interest, the 
lender based definition is the only one used in this study. 
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The rise of NTMs and subprime mortgages during the early 2000s was coupled with 
an increase in their market share (figure 2). NTMs were a tiny fraction of all mortgages 
originated from 1997 and 2001, and only first exceeded a 5 percent market share in 2003. 
However, the mortgage market share for NTMs rose rapidly after 2003 and topped out at 
about 30 percent in 2006. This rise is all the more dramatic because total mortgage 
lending grew by more than 2 million loans (about 40 percent) between 2001 and 2005, 
meaning that much of the net increase took the form of NTMs. Subprime mortgages 
represented about 5 percent of the market going back to the late 1990s, their share also 
expanded. In 2005, they represented 18 percent of the market.  
Figure 2 also shows the homeownership rate during that period. It increased from 66 
percent in 1997 to 69 percent in 2004, remaining at this level until 2006.  In aggregate, 
the homeownership rate did not increase between 2004 and 2006, the period of higher 
supply of NTM and subprime mortgages. It then decreased back to 65 percent by 2012. 
Although the homeownership rate did not increase during the 2004-2006 period, the 
number of homeowners kept rising by 0.9 million a year during that period, the pace 
slowed compared to the 1.2 million a year experienced in the 2000-2004 period (U.S. 
Census 2014).  
When looking at the distribution of NTMs and subprime mortgages over time and 
across space, we observe substantial variations across counties (figure 3). In 2003, NTMs 
represented more than 20 percent of mortgages in only a few places, specifically 
California counties concentrated in the San Francisco and Los Angeles metropolitan 
areas (figure 3-A). This changed significantly during 2004 and 2005, when NTM 
origination grew significantly in the sand states – Florida, Arizona, Nevada, and 
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California – as well as in high cost markets on the east and west coasts. As seen in the 
second panel of figure 3-A, by 2006 the NTM origination share exceeded 20 percent in 
many counties, with proportions exceeding 40 percent in nearly 20 counties. Several 
California counties even exceeded 60 percent NTM shares in 2006. Among the top 50 
counties ranked by their NTM share of all purchase originations in 2006, 37 were located 
in California, 5 were in Florida, 4 were in the Washington, DC metropolitan area, 2 were 
in the New York City metropolitan area, and 1 each was located in Hawaii and Nevada. 
The median NTM share was less than 20 percent in 2006, and markets in the lowest 
NTM share decile had percentages of less than 10 percent. Thus we see that NTM 
incidence was not uniform across geographies during this period. 
The final panel of figure 3-A shows NTM origination activity during 2008, after the 
NTM boom had effectively ended (2007 shows a sharp decline). By that point NTMs did 
not represent more than 10 percent of originations in any county, as the supply of NTMs 
having rapidly retracted with the crisis.  
Figure 3-B shows a relatively similar pattern with regard to the spatial distribution of 
subprime mortgages in 2003 and 2006, with a concentration of subprime mortgages seen 
in the West and in Florida. Two differences are of note. First, in 2003 subprime 
mortgages were more prevalent than NTMs, especially in a number of California 
counties. Second, the penetration of subprime mortgages in 2006 was higher than the 
penetration of NTMs in a number of counties in the Midwest and Northeast. In these 
counties, the rate of subprime mortgages was often above 30 percent. 
Table 3 compares the geographic distribution of the features of NTMs and subprime 
mortgages. To create this table, we ranked counties according to the frequency of a given 
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feature and then calculated the correlation coefficient of pairwise rankings. We find many 
product features are distributed similarly across counties. Correlation coefficients 
exceeding 0.9 were found between the distribution of mortgages with no and low 
documentation with the distributions of mortgages with teaser rates and with interest-only 
features; between the distribution of mortgages with teaser rates and interest-only loans; 
and between the distributions of loans with balloon payments and the distributions of 
loans with high CLTV and with long amortization periods. Among the NTM features, the 
geographic distributions of option ARMs and mortgages with high CLTVs were least 
alike, although a correlation coefficient of 0.55 is still high. The correlations between the 
geographic distributions of individual NTM features and the geographic distribution of 
subprime mortgages range between 0.36 and 0.54, with a correlation coefficient between 
the NTM and subprime mortgage geographic distributions of 0.58 overall. 
Figure 4 shows the share of NTMs and subprime mortgages across counties broken 
down by quintiles on three characteristics as of 2000: median house value to median 
income ratio as a measure of affordability and share of Hispanic and black households. 
The graphs show that NTMs were much more prevalent in the 2001-2006 period in 
counties that had a higher house value to income ratio as of 2000, reflecting a lack of 
affordability. NTMs represent more than twice the share of mortgages in the least 
affordable counties as compared with the most affordable counties (14.5 percent versus 
6.6 percent). The same relationship exists for subprime mortgages, although it is less 
pronounced (22.9 percent versus 16.3 percent).  
We observe a similar pattern as pertains lending to counties ranked according to the 
prevalence of Hispanic households. NTMs and subprime mortgages were both more 
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prevalent in counties with a higher share of Hispanic households (14.5 percent versus 5.8 
percent for NTMs and 25 percent versus 14.9 percent for subprime mortgages). 
The pattern for lending in counties ranked by the presence of black households differs 
from the Hispanic pattern. While we again observe an increase in the share of subprime 
loans as the share of black households in a county increases, the relationship is less 
strong. Moreover, we see no discernable pattern in the prevalence of NTMs across 
counties that vary in the black population share. This suggests that the NTM and 
subprime mortgage dynamics may differ for the black population relative to others. 
Since the use of NTMs and subprime mortgages by minority and low income 
households is higher than in the general population (Haughwout et al. 2009; Jaffee 2009; 
Mian and Sufi 2011; Bayer et al. 2016) it is also possible that the relationship with 
homeownership might be higher. As shown in Appendix A the correlation coefficients 
between the share of NTM and subprime mortgages and changes in number of 
homeowners in the entire population and among subgroups (young, Hispanic and black) 
at the local level are overall positive for the period 2000 and 2006 and negative for the 
period 2006-2012, but there are some substantial differences in the magnitude of the 
coefficients across groups. We turn in the next section to examining the relationships 
between NTMs and subprime lending and homeownership further. 
 
III. Results for NTMs, Subprime Lending, and Homeownership 
Methodology 
To explore these associations we estimate a series of models in which we regress the 
change in the number of homeowners and the change in the homeownership rate on a set 
of additional variables plus NTM and subprime mortgage prevalence, measured by the 
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number of NTMs and subprime mortgages originated and their market share. The 
coefficients on these latter variables are our coefficients of interest. We examine these 
relationships from 2000 to 2012, and thus cover changes in homeownership during the 
housing boom, the housing bust, and the overall cycle.  
The baseline models we estimate are: ∆𝐻𝑂!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝛽!𝑁𝑇𝑀0106! + 𝛾! + 𝑢!"# (1) ∆𝐻𝑂!"!! = 𝛼! + 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝛽!𝑋!!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒0106! + 𝛾! + 𝑢!"# (2), 
where ∆𝐻𝑂!"!! represents the change in the number of homeowners13 in county i 
over the period t to t+1 (2000-2012, 2000-2006, and 2006-2012)14, 𝑋!!"is the vector of 
housing market controls for county i at period t, 𝑋!!"is the vector of demographic 
controls, 𝑋!!" represents the vector of job market controls, 𝑁𝑇𝑀0106! is the number or 
the share of mortgage originated that were NTMs in county i over the period 2001-2006, 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑚𝑒0106!  is the number or share of subprime mortgages and 𝛾! represents state 
fixed effects that capture unobservable time-invariant state-level characteristics.15 
We run alternate models with the change in the number of minority or young 
homeowners as the dependent variable or with the change in the homeownership rate and 
partition the data or introduce interaction terms as discussed further below. 
                                                
13 Our measure of the change in the number and share of homeowners comes from the Census and ACS and 
is therefore unlikely to be biased by the reporting of owner-occupy status by investors on mortgage 
applications as discussed in Haughwout et al. (2011). 
14 These periods correspond to the boom and bust period. Based on data availability for the ACS, it is not 
possible to measure the change in homeownership on an annual basis for the period prior to 2005. We did 
also run an annual regression at the state level with lagged annual NTM and subprime numbers for the 
period 2000-2006 and results are similar to those found over the entire 2000-2006 period. 
15 Both population-weighted and non-weighted regressions were run with broadly similar results (Appendix 
B). The results discussed in the analysis are not weighted by population. As suggested by a reviewer we 
also combined the NTM and subprime measure into the same model. Due to the high level of collinearity 
between both measures we do not report the results. Those are available from the authors on demand. 
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For housing market factors, we include, from the ACS, median house value, the ratio 
of the median rent and median house value, and the ratio of the median house value and 
median income. We also use the MSA-level house price index from the Federal Housing 
Finance Agency to measure the change in median house value over the period t to t+1 
and construct a variable measuring house price volatility over the last 5 years to account 
for past house price performance.16 Together, these capture price and affordability 
considerations, which can both influence and be influenced by the use of NTMs and 
subprime mortgages.  
We include a vector of county-level demographic variables collected from the ACS, 
including number of households, mean household size, percent of family with children, 
percent black, percent Hispanic, percent foreign born, percent with some college 
education. Regarding job market conditions, we include median household income from 
the ACS and the annual unemployment rate from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Finally, 
we include dummy variables for the state the county is in, whether a county is in an MSA 
and whether it is suburban.17 Table 4 reports sample statistics for these variables. 
 
Baseline results  
Given the important change in the housing market that occurred in late 2006, we first 
divide the sample into two periods: 2000 to 2006 (the boom) and 2006 to 2012 (the bust). 
Table 5 shows the results for the boom and bust periods and the overall period.18 The 
                                                
16 For non-MSA counties, we use the state level index for non-MSA parts of the state produced by FHFA. 
House price volatility is calculated as “the variance of the five-year percentage change in the price index 
across 13 years of quarterly values” (Gabriel and Rosenthal, 2015: 11). 
17 As defined by the Office of Management and Budget. 
18 We present results using the aggregate number of NTMs originated during 2001-2006 as the variable of 
interest. We also tested whether the effect changed by year, using annual lags for the number and share of 
NTM. We have run all the analyses for the 2006-2012 period using up to 8 period lags. We further re-
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analyses in Table 5 and 6 include state fixed effects to control for variation in state 
circumstances that might bias estimates of the NTM and subprime mortgage 
relationships. Appendix B provides the full regression results, reporting the coefficients 
for all control variables. We also show in Appendix B that a likelihood ratio test indicates 
that inclusion of the fixed effects improves model fit but does not affect the sign and 
magnitude of the coefficients of interest. We cluster standard errors at the MSA level for 
all specifications to account for potential correlation of the error terms at the local level. 
We also show the result weighted by population in the appendix but use the unweighted 
results throughout.19 
During the boom period (Table 5, column 1-2), increased NTM and subprime 
mortgage activity is associated with more homeowners, whether NTM and subprime 
lending are measured in number or share of loans (although not a higher homeownership 
rate as discussed below).  For the number of loans, we use an aggregate measure of the 
number of NTMs or subprime loans originated during the 2001 to 2006 period. The 
regression indicates that the origination of 10 additional NTMs in the 2001 to 2006 
period is associated with 7 additional homeowners between 2000 and 2006, while the 
origination of 10 additional subprime loans is associated with 4 additional homeowners, 
which is a smaller but a still significant increase. These results hold when we use the 
percentage of all mortgages in the county that were NTMs or subprime mortgages as an 
independent variable. The share results indicate that a 1 percentage point increase in the 
NTM share is associated with 731 more homeowners, and the estimate is statistically 
                                                                                                                                            
estimated the relationships using the maximum NTM share in a county over the cycle as the independent 
variable. The results are robust to these alternative specifications. 
19 In addition, as a robustness check we ran a specification that included the change in renters. The results 
are robust to that specification. This suggests that counties in which there was a higher prevalence of NTM and 
subprime mortgages experienced a higher increase during the boom and decrease during the bust in the number 
of homeowners but that it was proportional to their overall population gains. 
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significant. A one percentage point increase in the subprime share is associated with 166 
more homeowners, a substantially smaller estimate than for the share of NTM but the 
estimate is also statistically significant. 
Table 6 reports the results of the same set of regressions with the change in the 
homeownership rate as the dependent variable. The coefficients associated with the 
number or share of NTMs and subprime mortgages are generally not significant when 
using the percent change in the homeownership rate as the dependent variable for that 
subperiod (or for any other period).  
The findings showing NTM and subprime mortgage activity as positively associated 
with the change in the number of homeowners in the 2000 to 2006 period are consistent 
with the narrative that exists regarding the role of NTMs and subprime mortgages in 
housing markets over the recent cycle, while the lack of relationship between the change 
in the rate of homeownership and NTMs and subprime mortgages is not consistent with 
this narrative.  
We next turn to the results of the analysis for the bust period, which are shown in 
columns 3 and 4 of table 5. While originations of NTMs and subprime mortgages were 
associated with an increase in the number of homeowners during the boom, they were 
associated with a decline in the number of homeowners between 2006 and 2012. Starting 
with subprime mortgages, we find the origination of 10 additional subprime loans during 
the boom was associated with a loss of about one homeowner during the bust. Similarly, 
we find a one percentage point increase in the share of subprime mortgages in a county is 
associated with 139 fewer owners. For NTMs, the origination of additional 10 mortgages 
in a county from 2001 to 2006 was also associated with a reduction of one homeowner in 
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that county from 2007-2012. When one looks at NTM penetration, we observe that a 1 
percentage point increase in the share of NTMs among mortgages originated during the 
boom was associated with a decline of 84 homeowners during the bust. However, none of 
these results are statistically significant, indicating a weaker negative association between 
NTMs and homeownership during the bust than what was found for subprime mortgages. 
For both subprime mortgages and NTMs, the magnitude of this negative relationship is 
smaller than the magnitude of the positive relationship during the boom. 
We also present estimates of the relationship between NTM and subprime mortgage 
activity and homeownership over the entire sample period (table 5, column 5-6). For the 
2000-2012 period, 10 additional NTMs originated is associated with 7 additional 
homeowners while 10 additional subprime loans originated is associated with 4 
additional homeowners.  
The control variables reported in Appendix B are generally of the expected sign with 
areas with higher income, a higher share of families, and college graduates, and a higher 
rent to value experiencing a larger increase in the number of homeowners over the entire 
period and in each subperiod while areas with a higher share of black resident, higher rent 
and house value experience a smaller increase.  
Appendix C reports results for the same models as those shown in Table 5 and 6 but 
with the NTM and subprime mortgage measures combined.20 The results are overall 
similar, although they strengthen the positive association for NTMs relative to subprime 
mortgages. In the model with the number of NTMs and subprime mortgages, the 
coefficients on the measure of subprime lending become insignificant. In the model with 
the share of NTM and subprime mortgages, the positive association found for subprime 
                                                
20 We thank two anonymous referees for suggesting this additional specification. 
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during the boom becomes negative but not statistically significant and becomes negative 
and significant for the overall period. The associations between NTMs and subprime 
mortgages and changes in homeownership rate remain insignificant across all periods in 
that specification as well. 
Results by subgroups of homeowners and by county characteristics 
 
We next take these general results and explore whether they hold across demographic 
groups of homeowners and across counties grouped by population subgroup share.  We 
examine three dimensions of demographic groups: age, race and ethnicity, and income. 
We first explore the association of homeownership and the use of NTMs and 
subprime loans for the young, as a proxy for first time homeowners. The literature has 
shown that young homeowners are particularly subject to borrowing constraints (Haurin 
et al. 1997). If NTMs are associated with greater homeownership, through overcoming 
constraints to lending, the population most likely to reflect a positive relationship 
between homeownership and the use of NTMs and subprime loans would be first-time 
homebuyers. Young homeowners, defined as homeowners whose household head is less 
than 35, are a reasonable proxy for first-time homebuyers, as it is considerably less likely 
that such homeowners have bought multiple homes (Berson and Berson 1997). 
The literature also suggests reasons that the relationships observed in the previous 
section might not hold across racial and ethnic subgroups. There is considerable evidence 
on deeper subprime mortgage penetration in communities with large minority populations 
than in the general population (Calem et al. 2004; Mayer and Spence 2008). There are 
competing arguments as to the implication of this for homeownership. On one hand, it 
could be that subprime mortgage (as well as NTM) products better match with the 
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circumstances faced by minority borrowers, and so are more important for their access to 
homeownership (Cocco 2013). Alternatively, a deeper penetration could arise due to 
incomplete markets and predatory lending strategies that place minority households at 
greater risk, which ultimate manifests itself in the form of weaker or negative 
homeownership relationships (Gramlich 2007; Calem et al. 2009; Agarwal and Evanoff 
2013; Agarwal et al. 2014). An earlier literature focused on whether minority borrowers 
were differentially excluded from access to borrowing for homeownership due to 
mortgage lending discrimination based on minority status or redlining (Guttentag and 
Wachter 1980; Munnell et al. 1996; Bostic et al. 2005). Indeed, “greenlining,” or the 
minimizing of rationing and a concomitant increase in homeownership with the 
introduction of nonprime mortgage has been associated with the use of NTMs and 
subprime lending.  
A similar set of arguments could be made regarding income. Calem et al. (2009) 
provide evidence that a larger share of prime and subprime mortgages were originated to 
low income borrowers during the boom. Deeper penetration could reflect better product 
efficacy, resulting in stronger ownership relationships, or increased vulnerability to 
abuse, which could lead to weaker or even negative relationships between 
homeownership and NTM and subprime lending.  
Because our data do not identify lower-income homeowners, we can only analyze the 
income relationships by using county wide characteristics. We use the indirect measure 
of the county median income as a proxy for the presence of low-income homeowners. 
We stratify counties based on median income with low income counties being those in 
the lowest quartile and high income counties the remained counties. We then compare 
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trends between both sets of counties. Tables 7 and 8 report the key results for the young 
and minority homebuyer analyses.21 These analyses reveal interesting findings. The 
homeowner relationships with both NTMs and subprime mortgages for both young and 
minority buyers during the boom are weaker than those for the entire population of 
homeowners.  
First, Panel A shows the homeownership relationships for NTMs and subprime 
mortgages for young homeowners during the boom. Because the baseline 
homeownership numbers and rates differ for young households and the overall 
population, one cannot directly compare regression coefficients. Rather, one must 
standardize the coefficients to make them comparable. We do so by expressing the effects 
in terms of standard deviations.22 For example, a one standard deviation increase in the 
share of NTMs is associated with a .31 standard deviation larger change in the number of 
homeowners in the overall population and a .26 standard deviation larger change in the 
number of young homebuyers. For the share of subprime mortgages, the associations are 
.12 and .07, respectively. Second, we see the opposite relationships during the bust. Here, 
the coefficients on NTM and subprime mortgage activity are negative, and the magnitude 
of the relationships is larger for young homeowners than for all homeowners together. A 
one standard deviation higher share of NTMs is associated with a 0.11 standard deviation 
larger decline for young homeowners compared to a 0.05 standard deviation larger 
decline for the overall population. A further difference from what was seen for the total 
                                                
21 We also conducted first-time homebuyer and racial group tests using two other approaches with similar 
results. Specifically, we create interaction terms involving the NTM and subprime mortgage metrics and 
the share of the county population that is either young (for the first-time homebuyer analysis) or black or 
Hispanic (for the racial group analysis). We also stratified our sample based on their share of young, black 
or Hispanic households and compared the relationship in high and low young and minority counties. The 
results of these analyses, which yield qualitatively similar results to the analysis reported in the text, are 
available upon request.  
22 We adopt the same approach for all subgroups. 
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population is that the NTM relationship is larger than the subprime relationship in the 
bust. 
Panel B and C report the results of the analysis for minority homeowners. The results 
for Hispanic homeowners (Panel B) indicate largely the same pattern as shown for young 
homeowners. We see positive relationships during the boom period, and negative 
relationships during the bust, with the boom coefficients exceeding the bust coefficients. 
However, the coefficients are smaller. For instance, a one standard deviation higher share 
of NTM is associated with a .3 standard deviation higher change in the number of 
homeowners during the 2000-2006 period for the whole population, but with a .1 higher 
change in the number of Hispanic homeowners. Here again, the NTM relationships are 
stronger than the subprime mortgage relationships in both the boom and bust periods.  
The results for black homeowners (Panel C) look generally similar to those for the 
young and Hispanic homeowners, with two important differences. First, unlike any of the 
other findings, the magnitude of the subprime mortgage relationship is statistically 
indistinguishable from the magnitude of the NTM relationship. This is consistent with 
results in other work showing that subprime mortgages played a larger role in black 
communities than in the general population. Second, we do not observe negative 
relationships in the bust period between homeownership for black households and either 
NTMs or subprime mortgages.23  
These results identify differences by subgroup. The main difference is that the 
positive relationship between NTM and subprime prevalence and change in the number 
                                                
23 We also looked at the relationships between NTMs and subprime mortgages and changes in the young, 
Hispanic and black homeownership. As in the general population, the relationships are not significant, 
indicating that areas with a larger number or share of these products did not experience a larger increase or 
decrease in young and minority homeownership rate during the boom or bust. 
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of homeowner found in the general population during the boom appears to be relatively 
smaller for minority households and in minority and low income areas. This is consistent 
with the notion that for these subgroups these products might have been substitutes for 
existing products rather than providing additional access to homeownership.  This may be 
behind our finding few additional new homeowners for these subgroups.  
Table 8 presents the findings for the county level income-based analysis. Here, low 
income counties are defined as those counties with median income in the lowest quartile, 
and we compare experiences between this grouping of counties and those counties with 
median incomes in the highest quartile. There is no substantial difference between low 
and high income counties in the coefficients for the number of NTMs and subprime 
mortgages during the boom.  
With regards to the share of NTMs and subprime mortgages, the positive relationship 
persists in counties with high median incomes, but is not seen in counties with low 
median incomes. For the low median income counties, the coefficients are negative, 
unlike in other cases, but they are not significant. This suggests that lower-income areas 
with higher levels of NTM and subprime mortgage activity did not experience 
disproportionate increases in the number of homeowners. Rather the positive relationship 
found between overall growth in number of homeowners and growth in NTMs and 
subprime loans as a share of overall loans is stronger in high income counties and either 
non-existent or negative in low income counties. During the bust, the coefficients are 
actually slightly more negative in high income counties, although the differences are 
largely not statistically significant. 
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IV. Conclusion 
This paper explores the relationship between the rise of non-traditional mortgage 
products (NTMs) and subprime mortgages and homeownership, looking at experiences 
during the 2000s when the prevalence of both subprime and non-traditional mortgages 
increased dramatically. We first document the evolution of both NTMs and subprime 
mortgages during this period, and establish some stylized facts about their volume and 
geographic distribution. Origination activity in both mortgage categories grew 
dramatically during the early 2000s and then abruptly ended after 2006. Activity for both 
was concentrated in high cost markets and sand sates, though subprime mortgage activity 
was distributed more broadly across the United States.  
We find that NTM and subprime activity was associated with an increase in the 
number of homeowners, but not in changes in the homeownership rate, during the boom 
period of 2000 to 2006, but was negatively associated with homeownership during the 
bust period of 2007-2012. There is no significant relationship between the prevalence of 
NTMs and subprime mortgages and changes in the homeownership rate at the local level 
during the bust. These results are specific to the periods examined here and would not 
necessarily hold for other periods during which NTMs and subprime mortgages 
represented only a small share of the mortgage market. 
When considering groups most likely to face borrowing constraints, we find less of a 
relationship between increase in number of homeowners and use of NTMs and subprime 
loans then for the entire population. For young homeowners who are thought to be most 
hampered by credit constraints, we see a significant positive relationship between NTM 
and subprime mortgage prevalence and homeownership during the boom. We see no 
significant relationship during the bust years.  For racial minorities, another key group for 
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whom credit constraints are particularly binding, we observe somewhat different patterns. 
The results for Hispanic homeowners indicate largely the same pattern (positive 
association during the boom, negative but smaller relationship during the bust), but the 
coefficients are smaller than for young homeowners or the overall population. The results 
for black homeowners follow the same patterns but differ in two ways from what was 
observed for the other groups. First, the NTM and subprime mortgage relationships are 
similar in magnitude. Second, the relationships during the bust are positive and generally 
insignificant. Finally, the positive relationship during the boom is not higher in areas with 
lower income levels. Taken together, these results suggest that, while NTMs and 
subprime loans may be associated with increasing homeownership at the local level, 
these benefits vary across the population.  
Finally, we find that overall the relationship between NTMs and homeownership is 
stronger than the relationship between subprime mortgages and homeownership during 
the boom but it is less negative during the bust.  
 These results are informative for several areas of policy concern. First, the gap in 
homeownership outcomes across racial and ethnic groups has been a policy issue of 
longstanding concern. While the literature has addressed issues on the predatory aspects 
of nonprime loans, it is possible that a more general outcome of such lending is the 
closing of homeownership gaps, for low income and minority households and for low 
income and minority areas. However, we find that there is no substantial difference 
between low and high income counties, and weaker NTM and subprime mortgage 
relationships for minority households.  Thus, these findings do not support the conclusion 
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that nontraditional lending products assisted in decreasing gaps in homeownership 
outcomes, geographically or by borrower racial or ethnic status.  
Second, in response to the crisis, two strands of literature have taken opposite 
positions on the role of lending to low income households. Mian and Sufi (2011; 2015) 
point to disproportionate lending to low income communities while Adelino et al. (2015; 
2016) and Foote, Loewenstein and Willen (2016) point to expansion of credit across the 
board for households at all income levels although they do not focus on nonprime 
lending. Here we find that the relationship found by Mian and Sufi for lending does not 
hold for homeownership.  
Taken together, these results call into question the view that an untargeted relaxation 
of borrowing constraints can result in the closing of persistent gaps across racial and 
ethnic groups and between groups stratified by income. Instead, they suggest that, in 
order to address existing homeownership gaps, more targeted measures are needed to 
improve access to mortgage credit in a sustainable manner. Such policies could 
potentially include education programs to increase financial literacy, pre-ownership 
counselling programs to improve consumer choice of context-appropriate mortgage 
products, post-homeownership counseling to ensure that the early years of 
homeownership are weathered smoothly, saving schemes to enable households to save 
for downpayments  and overcome economic shocks that could threaten loan repayment, 
and enforcement of regulations that prevent the steering of consumers towards mortgage 
products that are not beneficial to them. 
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Figures and Tables 
Figure 1. Non-traditional mortgage and subprime originations, 1997-2010 
 
 
Source: BlackBox, Urban Institute calculation of HMDA. Subprime share is only shown 
up to 2006. 
 
Figure 2. Non-traditional and subprime mortgages as a percentage of total purchase 
originations and homeownership rate, 1997-2010 
 
 
Source: HMDA, BlackBox, CPS/HVS. Subprime share is only shown up to 2006.  
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Figure 3. Geographic distribution of non-traditional and subprime mortgages 
Panel A. Non-traditional mortgages, 2003, 2006 and 2008 
 
Source: HMDA, BlackBox 
 33 
 
Panel B. Distribution of subprime mortgages, 2003 and 2006 
 
Source: HMDA, BlackBox. Subprime mortgages based on the originator definition are 
only available until 2006.  
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Figure 4. NTM and subprime mortgage share of all mortgage originated from 2001 
to 2006, by county quintiles grouped by selected characteristics as of 2000 
 
Panel A: NTM Share 2001-2006 
 
i. Median House Value to Median Income Ratio 
 
 
 
ii. Percent Hispanic 
 
 
 
iii. Percent Black 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: HMDA, BlackBox, Census 2000. 1 = lowest quintile 
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Table 1: Number of non-traditional features by mortgage 
 
Number of 
Traits 
Number of 
Loans 
Share of 
Loans 
One  2,193,571  43.8% 
Two  1,680,978  33.6% 
Three  863,153  17.2% 
Four  242,456  4.8% 
Five  25,595  0.5% 
Six  2,612  0.1% 
Seven  160  0.0% 
Source: BlackBox 
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Table 2: Non-traditional and subprime mortgage volume, 2001-2008 
 
  2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
NTM 51,771 147,563 256,068 700,273 1,368,395 1,742,624 725,316 15,941 
Interest Only 2.0% 2.8% 14.9% 30.1% 36.2% 30.5% 33.3% 28.4% 
Option-ARM with 
negative amortization 1.6% 1.9% 0.1% 4.8% 9.5% 7.1% 7.4% 4.0% 
Balloon payment 11.4% 25.9% 20.6% 18.4% 15.0% 28.7% 25.9% 21.3% 
Teaser rate 2.5% 3.0% 10.3% 15.1% 19.7% 15.6% 18.4% 36.3% 
Low or no 
documentation 75.8% 70.4% 57.9% 48.4% 55.8% 59.8% 70.3% 57.3% 
Terms >365 months 14.8% 7.0% 9.6% 8.9% 8.1% 22.3% 20.0% 23.2% 
CLTV at origination 
>= 100 11.0% 14.5% 23.0% 33.2% 30.4% 41.3% 38.4% 31.0% 
Subprime         
HMDA Definition 269,640 378,572 580,408 923,009 1,226,920 789,564 NA NA 
BlackBox Definition 44,240 106,174 167,550 364,477 602,765 609,852 160,771 4,404 
NOTE: Since many non-traditional mortgages have more than 1 non-traditional feature, the sum of the percentage  
adds up to more than 100% 
Source: BlackBox, Urban Institute calculation of HMDA 
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Table 3: Correlation in penetration of different non-traditional mortgages across counties in 2006 
 
 
Interest 
Only 
Option-
ARM with 
negative 
amortization 
Balloon 
payment 
Teaser 
rate 
Low or no 
documentation 
Terms >365 
months 
CLTV at 
origination 
>= 100 
NTM Subprime 
Interest Only 1         Option-ARM with 
negative 
amortization 
0.84 1       
 
Balloon payment 0.76 0.59 1      
 
Teaser rate 0.92 0.78 0.78 1     
 
Low or no 
documentation 0.91 0.82 0.87 0.92 1    
 
Terms >365 
months 0.75 0.62 0.97 0.75 0.86 1   
 
CLTV at 
origination >= 100 0.77 0.55 0.93 0.83 0.86 0.90 1  
 
Subprime 0.46 0.38 0.46 0.54 0.52 0.36 0.54 0.58 1 
Source: BlackBox, Urban Institute calculation of HMDA 
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Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 2000 2006 
Mean Minimum Maximum Mean Minimum Maximum 
Change in number of 
homeowners 
      
 2000-2006 6,425 -50,262 133,715    
 2000-2012 5,186 -96,183 135,434    
 2006-2012    -1,238 -86,762 46,872 
NTM volume, 2001-2006        
 Number 5,505 46 240,250 5,505 46 240,250 
 Share 9.0 1.5 28.4 9.0 1.5 28.4 
Subprime mortgage 
volume, 2001-2006       
 Number 9,910 126 436,165 9,910 126 436,165 
 Share 17.8 1.4 62.0 17.8 1.4 62.0 
Number of Households 111,628 18,798 3,133,774 118,788 19,118 3,172,032 
Owner Occ. 2000 (%) 63.5 18.4 84.5 63.5 18.4 84.5 
Mean Household Size 2.66 2.07 3.81 2.66 2.14 3.83 
College Educated (%) 51.3 27.1 83.8 53.7 29.7 82.1 
Age share (%)       
 25-34 13.6 7.6 25.4 13.3 8.2 19.6 
 35-44 16.0 10.6 21.7 14.3 9.6 20.6 
 45-54 13.6 7.9 18.4 14.5 8.2 19.6 
 55-64 8.8 4.8 15.1 10.7 5.8 16.7 
Family with Child. (%) 29.9 15.2 48.8 31.4 13.8 48.3 
Foreign Born (%) 6.3 0.4 50.9 7.5 0.3 50.3 
Hispanic (%) 7.7 0.3 94.4 9.4 0.2 95.1 
Black (%) 9.9 0.1 66.6 10.5 0.0 65.7 
Unemployment (%) 3.9 1.4 17.4 4.7 2.0 15.4 
Med. HH Income (000) 42.8 22.9 82.9 48.9 23.1 100.3 
Med. Rent 568 320 1,185 723 401 1,442 
Med. House Value (000) 113 39 493 195 54 902 
Rent to Value (%) 6.5 2.6 11.2 6.4 2.0 15.5 
Value to Income 2.60 1.37 7.68 3.83 1.34 13.23 
HPI Variance 0.03 0.00 0.27 2.95 0.01 23.14 
HPI Change (%) 57.5 9.6 176.3 -10.3 -62.9 44.8 
MSA (%) 87.4   87.4   
Suburban County (%) 20.6   20.6   
N 732   732   
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Table 5. Homeownership regression results, sample partitioned by boom and bust periods 
 
Panel A. Non-traditional mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NTM 2001-
2006 (#) 
0.717***  -0.0758  0.693***  
(0.121)  (0.0894)  (0.146)  
NTM 2001-
2006 (%) 
 731.0***  -83.88  510.1** 
 (197.1)  (99.62)  (206.9) 
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.724 0.617 0.636 0.634 0.506 0.415 
 
 
Panel B. Subprime Mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subprime 
2001-2006 (#) 
0.433***  -0.103**  0.375***  
(0.0763)  (0.0446)  (0.0943)  
Subprime 
2001-2006 (%) 
 165.8**  -139.2***  -14.70 
 (73.85)  (43.60)  (78.16) 
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.706 0.610 0.645 0.639 0.476 0.410 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the change in the number of homeowners in a county between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 
and 2012. These regressions include state fixed effects, whether a county is in an MSA or not and 
is suburban or not and control for county household number, household size, age structure, share 
of family with children, college graduate, foreign born, black, Hispanic, median household 
income, median house value, median gross rent, rent to value ratio, value to income, HPI variance 
and HPI change, and 2000 homeownership rate. 
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Table 6. Homeownership rate regression results 
 
Panel A. Non-traditional mortgages 
 
 
2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NTM 2001-2006 
(#) 
1.38e-05 
 
-9.38e-06 
 
-6.85e-06  
(1.63e-05) 
 
(2.01e-05) 
 
(2.01e-05)  
NTM 2001-2006 
(%)  
0.00449 
 
-0.0373 
 
-0.0487 
 
(0.0705) 
 
(0.105) 
 
(0.103) 
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.410 0.409 0.273 0.273 0.388 0.388 
 
 
Panel B. Subprime mortgages 
 
 
2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Subprime 2001-
2006 (#) 
2.03e-05* 
 
-2.67e-06 
 
4.57e-06 
 (1.05e-05) 
 
(1.24e-05) 
 
(1.26e-05) 
 Subprime 2001-
2006 (%)  
0.0232 
 
-0.0476  -0.0284 
 (0.0306)  
(0.0380)  (0.0300) 
Observations 729 729 729 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.411 0.410 0.273 0.275 0.388 0.388 
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the percent change in the homeownership rate in a county between 2000 and 2006, 
2006 and 2012 and 2000 and 2012. Each coefficient represents the result of a separate regression 
estimated using the same specification as in tables 5. 
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Table 7. Homeownership regression results, with change in the number of young and 
minority homeowners as the dependent variable 
 
Panel A. Young Homeowners 
 
i. Non-traditional mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NTM 2001-2006 
(#) 
0.166***  -0.143***  
(0.0397)  (0.0363)  
NTM 2001-2006 
(%) 
 128.1**  -69.94** 
 (50.92)  (31.20) 
 
    Observations 729 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.430 0.263 0.749 0.740 
 
 
ii. Subprime mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Subprime 2001-2006 
(#) 
0.113***  -0.0993***  
(0.0238)  (0.0182)  
Subprime 2001-2006 
(%) 
 19.29  -36.91** 
 (20.44)  (14.44) 
 
    Observations 729 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.433 0.252 0.755 0.685 
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient 
represents the result of a separate regression estimated using the same specification as in tables 5. The 
dependent variable for each regression is the change in the number of young homeowners in a county 
between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 and 2012. 
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Panel B. Hispanic homeownership 
 
i. Non-traditional mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) 0.284***  
-0.116***  (0.053) 
 
(0.032)  
NTM 2001-2006 (%)  181.2**  35.5 
 (75.51)  (44.75) 
     Observations 637 637 618 618 
R-squared 0.854 0.78 0.29 0.197 
 
 
ii. Subprime mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) 0.215***  
-0.0679***  (0.021) 
 
(0.015)  
NTM 2001-2006 (%)  37.61  -2.76 
 (33.26)  (19.69) 
     Observations 637 637 618 618 
R-squared 0.875 0.778 0.268 0.196 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient 
represents the result of a separate regression estimated using the same specification as in tables 5. The 
dependent variable for each regression is the change in the number of Hispanic homeowners in a county 
between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 and 2012. 
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Panel C. Black homeownership 
 
i. Non-traditional mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) 0.0316*  
0.0448*  (0.0190) 
 
(0.0266)  
NTM 2001-2006 (%)  153.9***  29.57 
 (53.28)  (49.07) 
     Observations 590 590 573 573 
R-squared 0.224 0.234 0.229 0.208 
 
 
ii. Subprime mortgages 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) 0.0294**  
0.00326  (0.0129) 
 
(0.00753)  
NTM 2001-2006 (%)  59.35***  -20.04 
 (21.13)  (16.86) 
     Observations 590 590 573 573 
R-squared 0.230 0.234 0.207 0.209 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient 
represents the result of a separate regression estimated using the same specification as in table 5. The 
dependent variable for each regression is the change in the number of Hispanic homeowners in a county 
between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 and 2012. 
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Table 8. Homeownership regression results, stratified by county income level 
 
Panel A. Non-traditional mortgages 
 
		 2000-2006 2006-2012 
		
Low 
Inc. 
High 
Inc. 
Low 
Inc. 
High 
Inc. 
Low 
Inc. 
High 
Inc. Low Inc. High Inc. 
NTM 2001-
2006 (#) 
0.783** 0.705*** 
  
0.0691 -0.0677 
  (0.333) (0.115) 
  
(0.169) (0.0919) 
  NTM 2001-
2006 (%)   
-137.3 517.1** 
  
-166.0** -232.0** 
  
(156.2) (218.4) 
  
(80.65) (92.79) 
         Observations 189 564 189 564 193 578 193 578 
R-squared 0.502 0.703 0.479 0.568 0.506 0.569 0.516 0.570 
 
 
Panel. B. Subprime mortgages 
 
		 2000-2006 2006-2012 
		
Low 
Inc. 
High 
Inc. 
Low 
Inc. 
High 
Inc. 
Low 
Inc. High Inc. Low Inc. High Inc. 
Subprime 
2001-2006 
(#) 
0.352* 0.414*** 
  
-0.005 -0.118*** 
  
(0.190) (0.0777) 
  
(0.0931) (0.0437) 
  Subprime 2001- 
2006 (%)  
-80.31 56.69 
  
-78.34*** -215.6*** 
 
(56.71) (95.08) 
  
(24.95) (50.95) 
         Observations 189 564 189 564 193 578 193 578 
R-squared 0.498 0.666 0.483 0.560 0.505 0.582 0.524 0.581 
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Each coefficient represents the result of a separate regression 
estimated using the same specification as in tables 5. The dependent variable for each regression is the change in the number of homeowners in a 
county between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 and 2012. “Low income counties” are those with median income below the 1st quartile; “High income counties” 
represent the remainder. 
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Appendix A: Pairwise Correlation Coefficients 
 
2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
 
Change in the Number of Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.75*** -0.59*** 0.32*** 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.43*** -0.28*** 0.22*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.71*** -0.63*** 0.26*** 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.30*** -0.33*** 0.06* 
 
Change in the Homeownership Rate 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.13*** -0.21*** -0.10*** 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.10*** -0.25*** -0.18*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.13*** -0.20*** -0.09* 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.01 -0.21*** -0.22*** 
 
Change in the Number of Young Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.005 -0.83*** -0.71*** 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.09** -0.45*** -0.33*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 -0.04 -0.83*** -0.74*** 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.03 -0.41*** -0.34*** 
 
Change in the Number of Hispanic Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.88*** -0.24*** 0.74*** 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.44*** -0.10* 0.38*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.90*** -0.20*** 0.78*** 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.42*** -0.06 0.38*** 
 
Change in the Number of Black Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.18*** -0.15*** 0.04 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.23*** -0.06 0.14*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.18*** -0.22*** -0.001 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.21*** -0.15*** 0.05 
 
Change in the Homeownership Rate of Young Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.09** -0.15*** -0.09** 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.11*** -0.27*** -0.24*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.10*** -0.14*** -0.08** 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.06* -0.18*** -0.17*** 
 
Change in the Homeownership Rate of Hispanic Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.01 -0.10** -0.06* 
% NTM 2001-2006 -0.004 -0.18*** -0.13*** 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.01 -0.10** -0.06* 
% Subprime 2001-2006 -0.01 -0.13*** -0.08** 
 
Change in the Homeownership Rate of Black Homeowners 
# NTM 2001-2006 0.01 -0.05 -0.02 
% NTM 2001-2006 0.03 -0.02 0.03 
# Subprime 2001-2006 0.02 -0.05 -0.02 
% Subprime 2001-2006 0.07 -0.07 -0.02 
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix B: Comparison between models with and without fixed effects and with 
population weights 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) 0.677*** 0.656*** 0.745*** 
    (0.151) (0.131) (0.170) 
   NTM 2001-2006 (%) 
   
398.9** 242.9 1,267**	
	    
(193.3) (185.0) (605.6)	
Number of Households -0.0441*** -0.0413*** -0.0600*** 0.00183 0.00333 -0.0102*	
	 (0.0156) (0.0141) (0.0130) (0.00986) (0.0106) (0.00554)	
Owner Occupied 2000 
(%) 
-49.26 -161.7 -1,380* -58.63 -166.3 -1,376*	
(122.4) (108.2) (776.2) (123.1) (104.4) (753.9)	
Mean Household Size -17,945*** -11,751*** -24,853* -16,365*** -9,318** -21,865	
	 (4,623) (4,281) (14,175) (4,760) (4,186) (14,718)	
College Educated (%) 293.3*** 350.1*** 788.6*** 250.1** 341.2*** 805.1***	
	 (94.67) (61.88) (221.5) (97.84) (65.96) (239.6)	
25-34 (%) 787.4* 970.8** 2,071* 510.8 1,111** 3,137*	
	 (458.4) (438.9) (1,116) (468.1) (480.1) (1,630)	
35-44 (%) 95.44 246.6 -1,350 432.3 247.5 -844.7	
	 (760.3) (668.3) (2,973) (856.3) (705.2) (3,289)	
45-54 (%) -792.9 -1,141 542.2 -1,494 -1,080 179.5	
	 (857.5) (915.2) (4,204) (1,034) (946.5) (4,241)	
55-64 (%) 492.7 2,273*** 6,812*** 245.9 2,291*** 7,256***	
	 (699.6) (511.7) (1,890) (687.8) (554.6) (2,057)	
Family with Children (%) 1,027*** 927.3*** 2,992** 941.0*** 1,089*** 3,349***	
	 (239.6) (228.6) (1,161) (239.8) (225.7) (1,109)	
Foreign Born (%) 98.03 -7.126 387.4 64.61 -89.89 -39.56	
	 (300.7) (285.9) (620.6) (277.9) (281.0) (620.8)	
Hispanic (%) 63.72 170.5* 89.52 64.96 175.5** 132.5	
	 (133.2) (95.18) (272.3) (124.8) (87.48) (261.6)	
Black (%) -165.0** -158.4*** -640.3*** -231.7*** -203.4*** -839.9***	
	 (70.42) (41.96) (215.4) (70.73) (47.08) (234.2)	
Unemployment (%) 208.2 -333.3 -597.9 -695.7 -795.8** -2,965**	
	 (498.3) (316.9) (1,289) (607.9) (358.3) (1,244)	
Median Household 
Income (000) 
1.096*** 1.262*** 1.686*** 0.863*** 0.718*** 1.421**	
(0.281) (0.275) (0.626) (0.293) (0.273) (0.704)	
Median Rent -28.00* -35.94** -80.50** -14.38 -5.356 -69.26	
	 (15.64) (14.94) (36.51) (14.93) (14.73) (46.14)	
Median House Value 
(000) 
-256.3*** -266.0*** -261.1** -220.8*** -212.3*** -309.3**	
(49.28) (48.82) (113.0) (53.00) (44.47) (130.7)	
Rent to Value 10,058 34,343*** 85,548*** -3,023 12,028 61,886*	
	 (12,759) (11,303) (32,799) (14,117) (12,326) (37,128)	
Value to Income 14,889*** 16,636*** 15,127 8,384** 8,786*** 11,127	
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	 (3,954) (3,783) (9,911) (3,852) (3,353) (9,418)	
HPI Variance (5 years) -2,625 7,296 -16,478 -11,909 -2,739 1,432	
	 (14,595) (11,282) (28,153) (14,815) (10,373) (30,029)	
Projected 1 Year HPI 
Change 
255.8 -108.3 1,442 237.8 -156.3 702.7	
(245.3) (239.2) (1,167) (243.5) (242.2) (1,153)	
MSA (ref.=Not MSA) -905.1 12.55 2,438 -1,748 -774.4 -2,510	
	 (956.9) (1,013) (3,486) (1,081) (1,057) (4,387)	
Suburban County 
(ref.=Central County) 
-575.4 621.4 6.026 -239.0 986.4 570.0	
(782.4) (928.5) (1,962) (855.4) (940.3) (2,421)	
Constant -44,037* -86,238*** -130,437** -4,869 -65,334*** -131,380*	
	 (24,382) (23,030) (64,718) (26,458) (24,478) (70,114)	
	       State FE YES NO NO YES NO NO 
Population Weighted NO NO YES NO NO YES 
       Observations 746 746 746 746 746 746 
R-squared 0.501 0.420 0.497 0.412 0.314 0.399	
	       
Likelihood-ratio test LR chi2(49) = 117.84  LR chi2(49) = 115.71  
(Assumption: No fixed 
effect nested in fixed 
effect model)  
Prob > chi2 = 0.000  Prob > chi2 = 0.000  
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent variable for each 
regression is the change in the number of homeowners in a county between 2000 and 2012. 
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Appendix C: Combined NTM and Subprime Models 
Panel A: Change in Number of Homeowners as Dependent Variable 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) 0.592** 0.228 0.820** 
(0.235) (0.256) (0.391) 
Subprime 2001-2006 (#) 
0.094 -0.227 -0.095 
(0.147) (0.148) (0.260) 
Observations 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.725 0.65 0.507 
      2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) 
NTM 2001-2006 (%) 759.5*** 176.2 824.4*** 
(243.2) (127.9) (268.6) 
Subprime 2001-2006 (%) 
-18.25 -179.6*** -216.8** 
(89.7) (56.8) (101.7) 
Observations 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.617 0.64 0.418 
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the change in the number of homeowners in a county between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 
and 2012. The regressions are estimated using the same specification as in tables 5 but with the measure 
of NTM and Subprime included in the same model. 
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Panel B: Change in Homeownership Rate as Dependent Variable 
 
  2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) 
NTM 2001-2006 (#) -0.0510 0.0474 -0.0118 
(0.105) (0.144) (0.123) 
Subprime 2001-2006 (#) 
0.0355 -0.0585 -0.0255 
(0.0446) (0.0540) (0.0344) 
Observations 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.410 0.275 0.388 
    
      2000-2006 2006-2012 2000-2012 
  (1) (2) (3) 
NTM 2001-2006 (%) -2.16e-05 -5.53e-05 -5.58e-05 
(3.54e-05) (4.11e-05) (4.21e-05) 
Subprime 2001-2006 (%) 
9.15e-06 5.20e-05 3.65e-05 
(2.22e-05) (4.04e-05) (4.11e-05) 
Observations 729 729 729 
R-squared 0.273 0.413 0.389 
 
NOTE: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependent 
variable is the change in the homeownership rate in a county between 2000 and 2006 or 2006 and 
2012. The regressions are estimated using the same specification as in tables 5 but with the measure of 
NTM and Subprime included in the same model. 
 
 
